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The objective of this paper is to study the impact of political connection and governance on credit rating and whether there is a substitution or complementary relationship between them.

In order to achieve the objective, a succession of eight ordered probit regressions has been carried out. Moderating variables between the political connection and governance characteristics were introduced. The whole population is taken as a sample, i.e., 27 Tunisian companies that are evaluated by FITSH NORTH AFRICA agencies over a period of 10 years (2009–2018).

The outcomes are mixed. They show that the political connection does not always influence credit rating; the size and board independence always improves credit rating; the duality between the functions affects credit rating; whereas the majorities’ proportion does not influence credit rating; and a substitution between the political connection and the governance characteristics is validated.

Like any other research, our results are factors of our measures and variable choice and depends heavily on the how these variables were conceived. Also, although our number of observations responds to the statistical result generalization requirements, our sample remains relatively narrow with 27 companies only.

In practice, the research will allow investors to have a better vision upon the future of their investments based on whether to develop their governance system or promote political networking. It will also prompt lenders to look beyond ratings and consider factors such as political connections to make a rational judgment on their future placements.

This study leads us to find various solutions: the establishment of credit agencies that take into consideration all the data of all the operators taken as a whole (bank, leasing company, and factoring). It encourages the reorganization of the Tunisian banking sector through mergers for example.

This study is a pioneer in the credit rating field in Tunisia, where the source of debt financing is the most used by all enterprises across all sectors. This study extends the literature of political connection effectiveness, independent directors, board size, in improving corporate performance and credit rating.

This article examines the link between the structure of the board of directors and target price accuracy using a sample of 51 listed firms on the Tunisian Stock Exchange over the period of 2011–2017.

In this study, the authors used the generalised method of moments (GMM) model to control the endogeneity problem.

As a result, that model can serve as a signal in the forecasting process. The authors' results suggest that target price accuracy is negatively related to board independence, and dual Chief Executive officer (CEO). In addition, CEO compensation tends to exert a negative impact on target price error.

The authors' findings are valuable for common investors because the findings can be useful in enhancing their capital allocation decisions by assigning higher weights to forecasts issued by firms with strong corporate governance systems. The authors' study also has practical implications for managers and policymakers. Specifically, the evidence provided herein suggests that firms with strong corporate governance mechanisms enhance the accuracy of market expectations, alleviate information asymmetry, and limit market surprises, especially in a context characterised by weak investor protection. The authors' results highlight the advantages of strong corporate governance in improving a firm's information environment and, therefore, are useful for the cost–benefit analysis of improving internal governance mechanisms. Additionally, the authors' results may prove useful to investors who can rely on the information provided by analysts for well-governed companies.

The authors' study contributes to the literature in both corporate governance and analysts' forecasts fields. The study provides additional evidence of the benefit of board quality attributes on target price accuracy in an emerging market characterised by high information asymmetry and weak investor protection. The authors' findings exhibit the effectiveness of board attributes in producing better financial information quality in Tunisia. This is useful for investors who may improve their capital allocation decisions by assigning greater weights to target price forecasts of companies with good governance quality, suggesting that good corporate governance is a credible signal of better financial information quality. These results have important implications for capital market regulators and corporate management in encouraging the implementation of good governance practices.

The authors attempted to assess whether corporate governance of listed firms are priced in the Tunisian context characterised by weak governance control and to highlight which mechanism is highly considered by independent financial analysts to build their forecasts.

The purpose of this study is to investigate the effect of politically connected directors (PCDs), media coverage and their interaction on firm performance in an emerging market economy (UAE).

This study relies on the agency theory and the resource dependency theory and uses a panel data set of a sample of non-financial firms listed in the UAE stock market from 2009 to 2016. Data were analyzed using fixed-effects regression. Instrumental variable regression was used to address potential endogeneity.

PCDs and media are positively associated with firm performance (ROE and Tobin’s q). Media moderates the PCDs–performance relationship, as the interaction between PCDs and media coverage is negatively associated with firm performance. Under growing media attention, reputational concerns prevent PCDs from using their connections to gain particular advantages to their firms to avoid damaging their image.

Regulators need to acknowledge and define the roles of PCDs and media in business governance.

To the best of authors’ knowledge, this study is the first empirical examination testing the effect of the interplay between PCDs and media on firm performance in an emerging market economy such as UAE.